Superstorm Sandy: Fuel Cell Design for Disaster Recovery vs. Backup Power

Abstract:
Superstorm Sandy impacted the east coast of the United States and Canada at the end of October 2012, causing destruction valued in the billions and creating power outages lasting between hours and weeks for millions of people. Effective recovery from such events includes having power and communication systems that have been designed for resiliency. Fuel cells have been used at communications facilities for more than a decade. They have provided backup power through many service-impacting events including hurricanes, winter storms, and electrical storms. Backup power, however, is somewhat different than power required to facilitate disaster recovery. At that point, it becomes more of a grid supplement paradigm and fuel availability and delivery become paramount to continuous coverage. This session will discuss the differences between backup power and power for disaster recovery and the fueling solutions necessary for successful operation during and after natural disasters. In late 2008, The U.S. Department of Energy released a Funding Opportunity Announcement, targeting Market Transformation for stationary fuel cells for communications backup. This program has been discussed at Intelec both in 2008 and 2010. One specific requirement of this program was the capability to provide 72 hours backup on compressed hydrogen. Since the inception of this program, ReliOn has installed over 425 sites with bulk storage of hydrogen. Many of these sites have fuel storage in excess of 72 hours, based on actual system load and fuel usage. This option— patterned on bulk gas deliveries to industrial users—can provide extended run time, reduce labor requirements and transport logistics, and decrease hydrogen wastage. This is an excellent alternative to large battery cabinets or internal combustion engines. In the case of large scale disasters, the existing infrastructure can be overwhelmed by the need for support and resupply. ReliOn is working with the industrial gas suppliers, third party support groups, technology developers and endusers to develop a pre-established plan with additional infrastructure, small scale mobile storage, and refueling capability to facilitate a more nimble and timely response. In addition to this work in North America, a grid supplement model, which calls upon ReliOn experiences in emerging markets, can augment our understanding of what constitutes an effective response to long term utility grid outages. In the emerging market model, large refueling reserves are required to be in place in a standby capacity. Grid downtime – several hours a day in many cases – and subsequent consumption of fuel drives the supplier toward an alternative economic model. This model emphasizes the need for a scheduled routine response, higher capacity on site and a moreinterchangeable (readily available) fueling support structure. This may include enlisting the support of third party vendors capable of filling in the re-supply gaps. There are numerous lessons that can be learned both from historical disaster recovery and the practices of North American and emerging markets that have a place in the global telecommunications marketplace because of an increasing need for disaster recovery and preparation.