A Two-Stage Spectrum Access Selection and Pricing Game for Cognitive Radio Networks

Conference: European Wireless 2015 - 21th European Wireless Conference
05/20/2015 - 05/22/2015 at Budapest, Hungary

Proceedings: European Wireless 2015

Pages: 6Language: englishTyp: PDF

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Kordali, Angeliki V.; Cottis, Panayotis G. (School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, 15780 Athens, Greece)

Spectrum trading is an important aspect of dynamic spectrum access in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). Apart from the traditional overlay or underlay access methods where Secondary Users (SUs) can acquire spectrum access opportunistically, the exclusive spectrum access for unlicensed users is gaining more attention. In the present work, a novel two-stage spectrum access and pricing game is proposed. A duopoly of spectrum operators offering Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) and Exclusive Spectrum Access (ESA) for different bandwidths and different prices is considered. At the first stage, non coordinated SUs select the access method they will follow in order to maximize their utilities. The symmetric N-SU spectrum access selection game, which is formed, has a unique mixed equilibrium based on the prices set by the operators. At the second stage, the operators pricing policy is based on an optimization problem with respect to the operators revenues at SUs equilibrium. Numerical results for both the access selection and the pricing game are presented for various bandwidth values and number of SUs.